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Abstract 
On 1 February 2012, member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic agreed on the text of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (the Fiscal Compact Treaty or FCT), subsequently signed on 2 March 2012. The 
new international treaty poses a number of questions on compatibility with EU law, implications for 
the Union legal system, institutional balance, national sovereignty and democratic accountability. The 
EUI debate on the FCT addressed some of these issues. 
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ANOTHER LEGAL MONSTER?  
AN EUI DEBATE ON THE FISCAL COMPACT TREATY 
FOREWORD 
This publication is based on the debate, which took place at the Law Department of the European 
University Institute on 16 February 2012. Not very much was available on that date on the then brand 
new Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT)1, making the debate especially topical. The background reading 
distributed to the participants included a report of the UK House of Lords “The Euro Area Crisis”2 
supplemented with oral and written evidence by Giuliano Amato (former Prime Minister of Italy), 
Edward Carr (The Economist), Professor Paul Craig, Charles Grant (Centre for European Reform), 
The Rt Hon David Lidington MP (Minister for Europe), Professor Steve Peers, and Olli Rehn (Vice-
President of the European Commission). Many places in the discussion refer specifically to this report. 
The main themes can be summarized as follows. First, there are legal consequences following from 
the international law nature of this treaty: adoption of the FCT does not need to follow the procedure 
for amending the Union Treaties, not all Member States of the EU must take part, while the resulting 
treaty can enter into force upon the ratification, in this case, by only twelve Member States; it does not 
enjoy primacy of EU law and does not have direct effect in the national legal orders, making the rules 
contained in this treaty less enforceable than Union law; the validity of its provisions is subject to 
compliance with EU law, including the duty of cooperation, and this is a mobile clause, meaning that 
also any future modifications of EU law will prevail over the FCT; finally, in this international law 
setting where not all Member States are onboard, questions may arise regarding the use of Union 
institutions and attribution to them of extra tasks. Second, there appears to be a consensus that in 
substance the FCT does not add very much to the governance of the Euro zone: it is primarily a 
political document that restates much of what had already been in place under the “Six-Pack”3 rules in 
Union law. The principle novelty breaking with EU law and, indeed, with one of the main principles 
of international law, could be the possible departure from the principle of equality of Member States. 
The German Constitutional Court in its Greek bailout judgment4 stated that under the German 
Constitution, “the decision on revenue and expenditure of the public sector [must] remain in the hand 
of the German Bundestag as a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically 
shape itself. As elected representatives of the people, the Members of Parliament must remain in 
control of fundamental budget policy decisions in a system of intergovernmental governance as well.” 
It would therefore appear impossible for Germany to ratify a treaty that imposes on its people 
budgetary rules other than those decided by the German people itself. Yet, this is exactly what the 
signatory states undertake to do under the FCT: to accept budgetary rules that do not result from the 
national democratic deliberation. This creates inconsistency between the position of Germany, where 
such rules exist as the emanation of the German people, and where the logic of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to preclude ratification of treaties imposing budgetary rules, and the 
other signatory states, who are expected to accept such rules (as a precondition for financial aid) not as 
a result of their democratic process but pursuant to an international agreement. Third, the practicality 
                                                     
1
 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, http://european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf (03.03.2012). 
2
 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 25th Report of Session 2010–2012, The Euro Area Crisis, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldeucom/260/260.pdf and www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-select/euroareacrisis/Evidencevolume.pdf (29.02.2012). 
3
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/898 (29.02.2012). 
4
 Judgment of the Second Senate of 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10, press release in 
English; www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg11-055en.html (29.02.2012). 
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of fixing budgetary rules, e.g. in the national constitutions and in the Union Treaties, may be 
questioned for the excessive rigidity of this approach. Moreover, undertaking international obligations 
to set budgetary rules in national law, especially in national constitutions, could render future Union 
action in this area more difficult, thus breaching the duty of sincere cooperation in EU law. Fourth, the 
FCT is illustrative of the progressive and increasingly prevalent shift away from the Community 
method and alternative instruments in EU law towards a blend of inter-governmental agreements with 
the use of Union institutions and with the subsequent incorporation of the substance of these 
agreements in Union law. The early examples of this approach are the Social Agreement annexed to 
the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement, which gave birth to the 
common immigration policy. The FCT therefore is not a new tool of European integration but yet 
another instance of Member States opting out of Union law for a more flexible and expedient solution 
but with practical use of Union institutions. 
The discussion is followed by concluding remarks on the broader constitutional questions highlighted 
and unresolved by this treaty. A brief outline of the main developments leading to the FCT is found in 
the Annex. 
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THE DEBATE: OPENING STATEMENTS 
Loïc Azoulai: 
I will make a statement to start the debate say why I think that the Fiscal Compact Treaty is a monster. 
There are many reasons why we can label this text a legal monster: it is poorly drafted; it does not fit 
with the body of EU law or at least there is some inconsistency there, which is an important question; 
and it risks to undermine the idea of the European Union. There are different legal issues to be 
discussed: the relationship with EU law; the relationship with national law and in particular 
constitutional law; constitutional integrity of the member states; the question of enforcement of the 
treaty and in particular the role of the Court of Justice; the role of the European Commission; the 
question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice; and the question of flexibility and differentiation 
which result from this text. Another thing that would be worth discussing is the picture of the 
European Union that emerges from this text: what picture of the European Union is reflected by this 
kind of agreement? 
Miguel Maduro: 
I do not have such a critical view of the treaty and its drafting. I think the drafters managed to do 
something that is not too bad in light of the very strong political constraints under which they were 
working. It must have been a difficult task for the poor lawyers who drafted this, and we have to take 
this into account. That said, let me now proceed to criticize the treaty... 
The curious thing is that the strongest criticisms that we can make of this treaty are also what makes 
these criticisms less relevant. Several of the criticisms that are made of this treaty regard both its 
content but also the flexibility that it leaves, the weak enforcement mechanisms, and that it adds 
almost anything new. All true. But if so, why should we care about what is in the treaty?  
The treaty has a political function – hopefully it will have a political function – and this is the value I 
assign to this treaty. It allows Mrs Merkel to sell in Germany certain things that she knows need to be 
done but that she is not able to sell to her own political public opinion otherwise. This, for me, is the 
goal of this treaty. It is not because European political leaders genuinely believe that this is what the 
markets want to end the crisis – they know that it is not the case – but they believe that this may have a 
political legitimating function with respect to the national public opinions. It is hoped that the political 
legitimating function of this agreement will then enable the politicians to take the measures that almost 
all economists long claim to be necessary. At least I hope that this is the understanding underlying this 
agreement.  
But let us talk about the legal monstrosity that gives the title to this roundtable.  
This agreement could have been adopted by enhanced cooperation and if it were adopted by enhanced 
cooperation it would have been much better because of several reasons: 
1. it would allow a proper and more efficient use of EU institutions; 
2. it would be the benefit from EU procedures and mechanisms of enforcement; 
3. it would have allowed for a possible real enhancement of economic and political coordination, 
one of the purported ambitions to which , in the end, this treaty adds almost nothing. 
Amendment of EU Treaties would have been even more preferable, though it was simply not possible 
because one of the Member States vetoed it. I think it was right of the other Member States not to 
accept the position of the United Kingdom, if I understand correctly what the position of the UK was. 
Although in the report form the House of Lords, the minister of European affairs of the UK refused to 
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articulate clearly what the conditions of the UK were, the indications given by the minister and what 
has been said is that the UK wanted a reintroduction in certain fields of competences of a veto right for 
the United Kingdom. I think this is unacceptable: one can only imagine the consequences if such 
precedent was open. 
Since a treaty amendment was impossible, it was decided not to proceed through enhanced 
cooperation. The explanation for the latter seems to be that some member states, in particular 
Germany, thought that a treaty would be symbolically more powerful. This is ironic: symbolically 
more powerful but legally less so. May be it was thought that it might be more legitimate but I am not 
so sure whether it actually is. In any event, this is what was decided and this choice limited the 
ambition of this treaty.  
On the one hand, this treaty is a restatement of the six-pack reform, of the legislation that was adopted 
already and of the appeals for further coordination on economic level at least among the states of the 
Euro area. All things already done. Even the Euro Summit has been taking place albeit in a less 
structured form. No hard core governance mechanisms have been introduced by this agreement. This 
agreement changes nothing in terms of reinforcing such mechanisms. There was even a talk about 
European economic government at some point. We remain very far from that. 
On the other hand, this prevented what some had feared might be a negative consequence of the 
introduction of mechanisms of hard governance into the treaties: further inter-governamentalization of 
decision-making and of political and economic leadership in Europe. This might have been the case. 
Had they opted for a reform of the Treaties, one of the risks would have been stronger inter-
governmentalization. In the end, things stay as they were except that the Commission is somehow 
actually reinforced by this agreement. In the end, when discipline is necessary, states go back to the 
“good old” community method… 
The new role of the Commission could give rise to a possible legal challenge, as is evidenced in the 
report of the House of Lords, where it is questioned whether it is lawful to attribute new tasks to EU 
institutions. In reality, the agreement is carefully drafted not to seem that they give EU institutions 
new competences; it allows the institutions to do some things if they want to do them. The agreement 
is drafted in such a way that we can say that they are not expanding the existing competences of EU 
institutions: they say that the Commission might do, it can be asked to do, and if the Commission then 
decides to act, for instance to prepare a report, it will be within the discretion of the Commission and 
binding only politically. However, there are other aspects that in my view could be in tension with EU 
law despite the obligation of consistency, coherence and compatibility with EU law that one finds in 
the agreement.  
The first aspect is nothing new introduced by this agreement but the reinforcement of an already 
existing practice under EU law, a practice that has never been discussed. I am talking about the fact 
that groups of Member States coordinate their actions and the positions that they are going to take in a 
particular area of EU competence and in a particular procedure of decision-making, organizing 
between themselves a kind of voting syndicate. This agreement reinforces the possibility of emergence 
of a voting syndicate and, in fact, makes it legally binding between those states: the Euro-plus states 
agree between themselves that they will deliberate and the object of this deliberation will determine a 
common position in some aspects of the Euro, such as sanctions. Is this compatible with EU law? 
Does it not affect the rights of other Member States? I have serious doubts. It is not a new practice but 
it now becomes legally binding for those states and I think it needs to be discussed. 
Now, regarding the so-called “golden rule”. There are many arguments in favour and against 
constitutionalizing budget discipline, and both can take a democratic form. The arguments in favour 
could be: 
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1. budget deficits for one state create externalities for the other states of the Euro area, and this 
justifies imposition of the budget rule in order to avoid these democratic externalities on the 
other states; 
2. budgetary discipline also serves to prevent inter-generational democratic problems within a 
state because the current participants in the national democratic deliberation who decide on the 
deficit now are not the same ones who will pay for this deficit in the future. Budgetary 
decisions are always problematic from the democratic point of view. It does not mean that they 
are not good or are not good for future generations, they might be, but from the democratic 
point of view they are complicated because it is one group of people deciding on something 
that is, to a great extent, about another group of people. 
The arguments opposing constitutionalizing budgetary discipline can be presented in democratic terms 
as follows: 
1. constitutionalizing budgetary discipline restricts the scope of political action and political 
choices, and entrenches a particular conception of economic and fiscal policy; 
2. this already problematic limitation at national level of future political deliberation, 
constitutionalizing budgetary discipline becomes even more problematic on the Union level 
because, for some people at least, it lies at the core of self-government and is necessary for the 
preservation of national democracy.  
Here comes one of the most ironic aspects. The other day I was in Dublin and I was asked for advice 
on how to push for a referendum on the new treaty in Ireland, one of the prerequisites for a referendum 
being that the treaty affects the national constitution and the sovereignty of the Irish people. I replied 
that the strongest arguments would be the decisions of the German Constitutional Court. The Lisbon 
judgment, and even more so the Greek bailout judgment clearly say that budgetary policy is one of the 
core areas of the concept of self-government that is necessary to preserve national democracy and state 
sovereignty. So Germany insisted on a Treaty that can be constructed, in light of its own 
Constitutional Court, as violating the conditions for national democracy present in the constitution. It 
is true that Germany itself has such a limit in its own Constitution but this is because the Germans 
themselves decided to have it. What the German Constitutional Court says is that this kind of issues 
have to be nationally decided; if they are not nationally decided, then national democracy is no longer 
preserved. I do not agree to this view but I can’t avoid the irony and wonder what will the German 
Constitutional Court say if called in to assess the compatibility of the agreement with the German 
Constitution. Finally, about drafting, which causes some perplexities as mentioned before. As I also 
said before, taking into account the constraints under which the agreement was drafted, a reasonable 
job was done. But there are some things that are rather bizarre for me, such as the concept of a 
“permanent rule”: I do not know what it is. They say that the “golden rule” needs to be a “permanent 
rule” preferably of a constitutional nature. I have never seen a permanent rule. If anyone can give an 
example of a permanent rule, please let me know, I would be very interested. The closest thing to a 
permanent rule I know are the eternity clauses in some constitutions, such as the German constitution. 
Paradoxically, under the Fiscal Compact Treaty, this “permanent rule” does not need to be in a 
constitution, so it is a rule that is more permanent than the rules that are found at the core of a 
constitution even if it does not need to be in the constitution… I think the “translation” is: “we want 
something that is important, or at least we want people to believe that these rules would be important”. 
However, if you look at the exceptions, a lot of flexibility has, in fact, been introduced.  The “golden 
rule” may not even be silver. 
The last ironic aspect is that from the point of view of enforceability this international treaty is weaker 
than EU legislation, than the six-pack legislation for example. Even if the Court of Justice is given 
jurisdiction to decide on the national implementation of the “golden rule”, this international agreement 
is an international agreement. As such, one may claim that it does not benefit from supremacy or even 
direct effect. 
Anna Kocharov (ed.) 
6 
Bruno De Witte: 
As I agree with most of the things said by Miguel, I will try to make some additional, specifically 
legal, comments.  
The nature of this document is that of an international treaty between less than all the member states of 
the European Union. The organizers of this event wonder whether this is a “legal monster”, but in fact 
it is less unique than one would think. Perhaps it can be called a monster if you look at its content and 
disapprove of it, but the instrument itself, namely an agreement between some of the members of the 
EU, is something we have seen throughout the history of European integration though rarely between 
so many member states. I can think of one other example of an agreement concluded between almost 
all member states, namely the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. In 
Maastricht, 11 of the then 12 member states (the United Kingdom being the missing one) agreed to 
sign this Agreement, and a separate Protocol on Social Policy, concluded between all member states as 
part and parcel of the Maastricht Treaty, allowed the 11 to “use” the EU institutions.  
Apart from this example, there are many other cases of what one could call partial agreements, that is: 
agreements between some but not all the member states. At the time the European Communities was 
created, one such agreement entered into force almost simultaneously, namely the Treaty establishing 
the Benelux Economic Union, and the EEC Treaty contained an express reference to it which basically 
authorized this partial agreement, whose content overlapped considerably with the EEC Treaty, as 
long as it went further than EEC law and none of its legal rules conflicted with EEC law. This explicit 
authorization is still in the Treaties today, namely in Article 350 TFEU. Later on, there were other 
examples, of which the most well-known were the Schengen Agreement and Schengen Convention 
that were initially concluded between a limited number of member states but whose membership later 
expanded without ever including all the EU countries.  
If one looks more closely at those various partial agreements, two categories can be distinguished: 
1. special interest agreements, when some member states have a special interest in something 
which the others do not share; take for example the protection of the environment of the Alps: 
only the member states whose territory is part of the Alps have an interest in concluding such 
an agreement, but the others not; 
2. the “move forward” agreements that try to push forward the agenda of European integration in 
a situation where not all member states are ready to do so; this was the case with the Agreement 
on Social Policy and with Schengen, and this is the case now again with the Fiscal Compact 
Treaty: not all countries are prepared to take this (alleged) step forward in integration, and the 
conclusion of a separate international agreement allows them to do so.. 
The advantages of these instruments are readily apparent. They are based on the fact that EU member 
states are still sovereign states with the capacity to conclude international treaties. By concluding a 
separate agreement, its signatories can bypass veto positions for single countries that may exist under 
EU law. Another advantage is in relation to the entry into force: if you draw up a separate international 
agreement, you can also adopt specific rules for its entry into force, and in fact this Fiscal Compact 
Treaty allows for its entry into force if only 12 of its 25 future signatories will ratify it. This is not an 
unimportant detail of course because we can expect major difficulties at the ratification stage, for 
example in Ireland where a referendum will be held. 
There are certain legal conditions for the conclusion of such separate agreements. First, they have to 
respect the primacy of EU law. The Fiscal Compact Treaty does so, as is made clear in the well-
drafted Article 2(2): “The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the 
Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law.” This is a mobile conflict rule: 
it recognizes not only the primacy of EU law as it stands today but also as it might become in the 
future: if, for example, new provisions of secondary EU law will be enacted that conflict with the 
Fiscal Compact Treaty, they will prevail. A second condition is respect for the duty of sincere 
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cooperation: states cannot sabotage or undermine the functioning of the EU by concluding separate 
international agreements, and in that context the point raised by Miguel about the ‘voting syndicate’ 
could be controversial. The fact that the parties to the Fiscal Compact Treaty agree to vote in a certain 
way within the EU Council will indeed affect the operation of that EU institution, although one could 
add here that the same thing happens already now between the Euro area countries: the ‘Ecofin’ 
Council meetings are usually preceded by meetings of the ministers of finance of the Eurozone 
countries at which they agree on certain positions, and afterwards they vote together in the Council 
along those lines. So, there is in effect a voting syndicate of the Euro area countries. In my view, this 
facilitates decision-making in the Council and should not be considered a breach of the duty of 
cooperation; one could take the same view for the voting syndicate contemplated by the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty. 
I now move on to the famous question of the ‘borrowing’ of the EU institutions. There is a major 
difference to be made, in this respect, between the Court of Justice and the other institutions. As we 
can read in the report of the House of Lords that was circulated before this meeting (The Euro Area 
Crisis, 25th report of session 2010-2012), Article 273 TFEU has been in the Treaty from the very 
beginning and it allows the member states to submit to the Court of Justice, “under a special 
agreement between the parties”, “any dispute between Member States which relates to the subject 
matter of the Treaties”. The subject matter of the FCT is indeed closely connected to the TEU and 
TFEU, and Article 8(3) of the FCT is expressly declared to be a ‘special agreement’ in the sense of 
Article 273 TFEU. This possibility of giving extra competences to the Court of Justice has been 
repeatedly used in the past, most famously perhaps in the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments (now replaced by the so-called Brussels-I Regulation), which was a separate 
convention concluded between the member states of the EC in which they created a preliminary 
reference procedure involving the Court of Justice, similar to but not identical with the general 
preliminary reference procedure provided by the EC Treaty..  
But what about the other institutions? According to Article 13(2) TEU, the EU institutions shall act 
within the limits of the powers given to them under “the Treaties” (meaning: the TEU and the TFEU, 
and no other treaties). This would be a strong textual argument for the view that it is not possible to 
give any new competences to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council under separate 
international agreements such as this one. Although the powers or the tasks given by the FCT to the 
EU institutions are rather modest, some powers or tasks are indeed given to the Commission, to the 
Council and even to the European Parliament. One way to make sense of this is to distinguish between 
‘competences’ and ‘tasks’. What Article 13 TEU seeks to convey is that the competences of the 
institutions are fixed by the treaties; it does not exclude that extra tasks may be given to the institutions 
as long as those tasks fit within their competences. To explain this difference, a parallel can be made 
with secondary EU legislation, by which new tasks are often given to the Commission and the 
Council, e.g. to further implement a piece of legislation. Those tasks fit within the general 
constitutional mandate of those institutions but they are extra tasks, in the sense that they are not 
specified with so many words in the Treaties but are being gradually defined as EU law develops. In 
the present case of the FCT, this does not happen through secondary legislation but through a separate 
international agreement, the main difference being that, as Miguel already said, the Commission and 
the Council are under no obligation to perform those tasks but are free to accept them or not (although 
they will of course accept them...). Now, do those extra tasks defined by the FCT fit within their 
constitutional competences, as defined by the TEU and TFEU? Without having studied the FCT in 
great detail yet, my impression is that this is indeed the case: within the context of their competences 
in the field of Economic Union, as recently fleshed out by the ‘six-pack’ legislation, the institutions 
will also perform the tasks which are attributed to them under the FCT. 
So, to conclude, whereas I agree that there was no legal or political need for this international treaty, I 
would also say that it does not raise major problems from an EU law perspective. 
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Anna Hyvärinen: 
I will try to shed light on the history of this agreement. Last year, Germany was pushing very hard for 
a treaty amendment, and behind this there was a call for more discipline of the Euro-zone countries. 
Especially Finland and the Netherlands supported these calls, whereas most other member states 
thought that, instead, more solidarity is needed. Three main alternatives for treaty amendment were 
discussed: 
• to amend Article 126 TFEU (the excessive deficit procedure); 
• to amend Article 136 TFEU which is only applicable to the Euro-zone countries; 
• to amend Protocol 12 on the excessive deficit procedure. 
The December 2011 European Council was a turning point for these discussions. Before and even 
during these Council meetings, there were serious discussions and a push to amend the treaties. 
However, when the UK did not get all the safeguards it wanted and refused to sign, the other member 
states opted for having an international treaty instead. The speed of the negotiations on the new 
agreement was quite unusual, which may show in the end result, as was already mentioned. The first 
meeting took place just before Christmas. In the negotiations, there were three persons from each 
member state, three representatives of the EP, and – obviously – the Commission and Council legal 
service were also present. During the holidays, member states had a chance to deliver written 
comments on the first draft. The negotiations continued after the holidays and they only lasted two to 
three weeks, which is quite exceptional: the process was very fast. The agreement was finalized at the 
summit of the Heads of states in the end of January 2012. So you can imagine that the civil servants of 
both the member states and of the institutions were under an immense pressure when drafting this 
treaty. 
Taking up the case of Finland, the good thing about our constitution is that it requires that the 
government inform the parliament on EU matters without delay. So there is a lot of public 
documentation, and it is even available on the internet. In this matter, only a few days after the first 
draft was issued, a detailed legal analysis was sent from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Parliament; 
the latter actively discussed the issue and requested information on the negotiations, which is very 
good for democratic accountability. 
In March 2012, the treaty will be signed and it will be time for ratifications. The treaty will enter into 
force quite soon. What is required is either the ratification of 12 Euro-zone member states or, failing 
that and past 1 January 2013, the ratification of any 12 member states. What is even more pressing is 
the clear link in the recitals of this treaty with the European Security Mechanism. In the future, a Euro-
zone member state wishing to receive help from the ESM is invited to ratify this treaty and to 
transpose the balanced budget rule into its legislation. This is probably the most important point in the 
recitals of the new agreement. 
What will become of this agreement? Some of its rules will be incorporated into the EU legislation, for 
example Article 6 FCT on debt issuance plans and Article 11 FCT on major economic policy reforms. 
In other words, some powers given to the Commission in the agreement will also become part of the 
secondary legislation very soon. This may facilitate the dilemma on the use of EU institutions in an 
international treaty such as the present treaty. In addition, Article 16 FCT contains the goal of 
incorporating these provisions into the EU legal framework; in practice, this means the EU Treaties. 
Further, the recitals provide that these rules will be incorporated in the EU Treaties as soon as 
possible. Within the first five years there will be an assessment of implementation. Then it will be 
discussed whether to make the new agreement a part of the founding treaties. 
In my personal opinion, despite the good intentions, this may turn out to be somewhat 
counterproductive. Already Article 126 TFEU on the excessive deficit procedure is very detailed As 
demonstrated in the six-pack negotiations last year, member states wanted quicker and more efficient 
procedures, but there are limits on what can be done because of Article 126 TFEU. The situation 
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might become even more challenging if the new agreement with its many detailed rules is 
incorporated as such into the EU Treaties. It would set in stone certain things, which might be better 
placed in secondary legislation. 
To conclude, I would like to point out the main features of this agreement: 
• the debt ratio or the “golden rule”; 
• the automatic correction mechanism, which must be transposed into the national legislation; 
• closer economic policy coordination between the Euro-zone countries – here lies a potential 
controversy because economic policy is a matter of all 27 member states; 
• governance arrangements. These do not go as far as particularly France would have wanted. 
However, I find it positive that now the arrangements are codified. Hopefully this will lead to 
preparing EU summits properly in the Euro-group. In the past, hasty preparations have been a 
problem. 
Although the new agreement is a legal document in the form of an international treaty, personally I 
that it has the nature of a political document. There are certain articles, which are written as legal 
provisions but in many instances the language of the agreement resembles European Council 
Conclusions. To give some examples: the recitals; the phrasing “inviting” the Commission to act in 
different issues; Article 7 including a gentlemen’s agreement on reversed qualified-majority voting 
(this is not really a legal rule but a specific voting commitment between the Euro-zone states); and the 
articles on competitiveness and growth, which merely set the goals and do not put into place new 
obligations. 
This treaty is a mix of many things, legally and politically. 
Marise Cremona: 
I will say something about fragmentation / differentiation, the use of the Court, and some of the 
drafting issues. 
First, as regards the issue of fragmentation / differentiation / enhanced cooperation, Bruno has put it 
extremely well: this is a technique, which has been used before. The real question is that it seems to be 
becoming more common, it is more and more the escape route and it poses questions as to the way in 
which the European Union can actually go on working as it is at the moment. Particularly, it shows 
that Treaty amendment procedures do not work, and it is very difficult to get change; it shows that 
enhanced cooperation is not the solution of choice of the member states. There would have been some 
difficulties with enhanced cooperation as Bruno said but I think it could have been managed, perhaps 
using Euro-zone enhanced cooperation under Article 136 TFEU, together with enhanced cooperation 
under Article 20 TEU.  It could have been done that way if they had wanted to do so, but the choice 
was not to do that. It is quite interesting that member states in the end, when they are in a crisis and do 
not know what to do, fall back on what they know and what they know is the traditional kind of 
international agreement: they feel more comfortable with international agreements, they know how to 
do those things and, as Anna said, they did it remarkably quickly. . 
So the draft Treaty is a form of differentiation, as an alternative to enhanced cooperation, but in 
Article 10 it also envisages action under Article 136 TFEU and enhanced cooperation as possible 
future developments. Enhanced cooperation has two distinct rationales which are sometimes in tension 
with each other: the first is to see it as an avant guard, the participants moving forward on a project in 
the hope and expectation that others will later join; the second is to see it as a way of unblocking a 
decision-making impasse, of finding a way for some Member States effectively to opt out of a 
decision. The draft FCT shows aspects of both characteristics: in terms of its genesis it is primarily 
about getting a decision in face of the UK ‘veto’, and in its recognition in Article 10 that ‘active use’ 
will in future need to be made of enhanced cooperation it assumes that the differentiation will need to 
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continue in the EU Treaty framework. But by referring to the objective of eventually incorporating the 
FCT into the ‘legal framework of the EU’ (Article 16) and by allowing for the participation of all 
Member States (Article 15) it presents itself as a transitional stage of integration.   
I take Miguel’s point about the dangers of limiting future action, but in a way this has also been done 
before. One of the reasons why we are where we are today is because of the constraints that were put 
in place at the setting up of the European Central Bank and EMU, the Treaty-based enshrinement (in 
Article 4 EC) of the maintenance of price stability as the primary objective of economic and monetary 
policy. So we might now be compounding the error, since this is something that has been tried and that 
caused problems before.  
Second, as regards the use of the Court and the other institutions, it is clear that as far as the Court 
goes we are within the scope of Article 273 TFEU (Article 8(3) of the FCT). This is one issue where it 
is quite instructive to look at the earlier versions of this treaty because it has changed, particularly if 
one looks at the role of the Commission. At one stage it was proposed that the Commission would be 
able to bring an action before the Court to enforce Article 3(2) and that has disappeared. It has 
disappeared for a very good reason, namely that Article 273 TFEU refers to disputes between member 
states. Obviously one can argue that there are other reasons for giving the Commission a lower profile 
but legally speaking this is one of them. There has been some questioning whether this treaty falls 
within the ‘subject matter of the treaties’ as required by Article 273 TFEU, but I think Steve Peers 
makes a very good point on this in his evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee when he says 
that Article 344 TFEU already gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court as far as the EU Treaties are 
concerned, so if Article 273 TFEU is to mean anything at all, then it should refer to something that 
goes beyond the actual content of the EU Treaties but at the same time relates to the subject matter of 
the Treaties, which is something different. The question that arises here, and it arises also in relation to 
the other institutions, is whether it is possible to grant the Court these powers by majority rather than 
by unanimity, and the fact that this is an international agreement of some not all the member states. As 
far as the first is concerned, I would point out that this is an agreement within Article 273 TFEU, not 
an exercise of competence under Article 273: Article 273 does not confer a power on the Union while 
establishing decision-making procedures for its exercise; it rather allows a Union institution to accept 
jurisdiction if it is decided to refer a case to it. There is nothing in the text that requires unanimity, 
only that there is a ‘special agreement between the parties’, i.e. the parties to the dispute. As regards 
the second issue, there are precedents for granting the Court jurisdiction in cases where not all 
Member States participate in the agreement. In the case of the 1980 Rome Convention, the jurisdiction 
of the Court was dealt with in two Protocols and the member states who adopted those two Protocols 
issued a Declaration expressing the view that ‘any State which becomes a member of the European 
Communities should accede to this Protocol’.. In my view then, neither unanimity nor participation of 
all Member States is required by Article 273. 
In terms of the drafting, I would like people’s view on one point: as Bruno said, Article 2 is drafted 
well, but I have a question on the second paragraph: why does it say that “The provisions of this 
Treaty [...] shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic 
union”: why this qualification which appears as a limitation? Why not just “upon the competences of 
the Union” ? Why should not the FCT protect Union competence in the area of the internal market for 
example, which is of course what the UK was concerned about – and still is concerned about? 
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DISCUSSION 
Federico Fabbrini: “A double “golden rule” for Europe?” 
My question concerns the “golden rule” required by the Fiscal Compact Treaty and the implications of 
the existence of this rule both at the national level and the EU level in Europe. From a comparative 
constitutional perspective, it may be noticed that also other fiscal unions are characterized by the 
existence of analogous rules at the state level. In the United States, for instance, 35 states out of 50 
have a balanced budget requirement in the state constitution. However, in the US, there is no 
equivalent rule at the federal level. On the contrary, in the EU, we also have a golden rule at the 
supranational level since Article 310(1)(3) TFEU institutes a balanced budget requirement for the 
Union. If we have the same constitutional requirement at both national and EU levels, what are the 
implications in terms of the policies that may be adopted to tackle the economic crisis? Does this 
compel the abandonment of any Keynesian strategy to stimulate the economy and are there any other 
options available? 
Boris Rigod: 
I have a comment on generational justice mentioned by Miguel: the biggest promise is not the next 
generation justice but the present generation justice. If you look at Greece, I do not know whether the 
next generation will suffer but this generation suffers from budget deficits already. 
Miguel Maduro: 
They are suffering from the deficits created by the previous generations 
Boris Rigod:  
Concerning the Lisbon judgment, what the German Constitutional Court said is not that you cannot 
coordinate your budgetary policies but that you cannot transfer the competence over national budget, 
for instance to the Commission. Certainly, member states may agree to maintain certain levels of 
deficits. So I doubt whether the limitation there is so strict. 
About using the Commission under the FCT: the major issue is about having the other member states 
pay for it. Why should the British taxpayers fund the Commission when the Commission does 
something for the Euro-states? 
Miguel Maduro:  
There is a difference with what is happening already under the EU Treaties because the UK agreed to 
that asymmetric use with respect to what is in the EU Treaties, it is part of the agreement on the opt-
out that they agree on the use of the institutions by the other Member states on the issues they have 
opted-out. In this new agreement, of course the Commission can start something under different rules 
but is not legally obliged; this is why the wording used in the FCT is “invited to”. This is why the 
Commission is not given the power to start the infringement procedure but is instead invited, if it so 
decides, to study and therefore make a proposal that then the member states are obliged to comply 
with. From the point of view of the Commission, it means that they are using their resources for 
something that they are not obliged to do and in that respect it is not much different from what we 
already know takes place. 
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Loïc Azoulai: 
It is an invitation which does not specify who is inviting the Commission: it can be an invitation by the 
European Council to make a report under the rules of the EU treaties and then the contracting party 
will be obliged to bring the infringement proceedings to the Court of Justice. So it is a power to dictate 
the introduction of the “golden rule”, possibly through a constitutional amendment and then, if the 
parties do not comply, to bring an enforcement procedure similar to that under Article 260 TFEU, 
meaning that there might be financial sanction should a member state not comply with the judgment of 
the Court of Justice. I do not see there the idea of an agreement of the contracting party to submit the 
dispute to the Court of Justice. I see a renewed jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Justice to impose 
a procedural obligation, to impose the introduction of a rule, it is even worse than the eternity clause 
because you dispossess the people of their sovereignty, you impose a constitutional amendment... 
Marise Cremona:  
But they signed the treaty, nobody forces the states to sign treaties. 
Miguel Maduro:  
It is not that the Court will be imposing, it is the member states that have entered into an obligation by 
signing a treaty. The question is the compatibility of this obligation with the constitutions of some 
member states, and the example I would give is Germany or the German Constitutional Court 
judgments: according to these judgments, by imposing that obligation this treaty is transferring 
something that, according to the German constitutional court, cannot be transferred to the European 
Union. There is such a requirement (a budgetary limit) in the Constitution of Germany but it is 
because the German people decided so, and according to the judgments of the German Constitutional 
Court, that decision cannot be transferred to the Union level, yet this is what this agreement is all 
about. One must remember that what is done in here is different from the stability pact criteria that 
wasn’t really legally enforceable. Now, at least political leaders say this will be. 
Loïc Azoulai:  
By doing that, the agreement amends the pouvoir constituant of the member states. 
Bruno De Witte: 
But it is still an international agreement, so it will not prevail over the national constitutions of the 
member states. 
Miguel Maduro:  
This is another irony: the way to ensure that this agreement does not encroach on the national 
sovereignty is by making it in international law so that it is not enforceable with respect to the national 
constitutions. 
Francois-Xavier Millet:  
It is very interesting that Anna mentioned that this agreement is very much like a decision of the 
European Council meeting, and indeed it is very much soft law, so I would not see the language 
“preferably constitutional” as legally enforceable. It is more recommendation style, not a strong 
wording. As Bruno mentioned, this was already done before, not a new form of amending the treaty. 
In the past, it has been done in the form of decisions of the representatives of governments within the 
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European Council meetings: it happened in 1992 for Denmark in the framework of the Maastricht 
treaty and for Ireland in 1999. The problem here was that there were some member states who would 
not agree, so they took another form. Still, I think a better comparison would be the decisions of the 
representatives of the governments in the European Council meetings that set recommendations rather 
than binding norms. 
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz:  
I see from this conversation that there is a consensus that what is new in this treaty is very limited: in 
terms of content it seems to be very much in line with what we have already. So then there are a 
number of questions: 
The legitimacy aspect, the point between input and output legitimacy: all this exercise is serving just 
to please the German public opinion with the irony that Miguel mentioned. I think this has an impact 
on the whole architecture of the EU. 
The point by Marise that it is ever more confusing, that there is no clear structure anymore: the ideas 
of the hierarchy and supremacy do not exist and we have all sorts of intermediary forms: what does it 
mean for the constitution of the EU? 
For an economic lawyer, the crucial document is the Lisbon declaration in 2000, this was for the 
making of EU law in the field that concerns trade, money, finances, is much more important than later 
Treaty amendments. This efficiency-driven document changed the whole impact and the way of 
thinking. Today, there is no clear distinction anymore, for example financial services: if we take the 
so-called MiFID directive plus the regulations, there are 250 pages of law, yet it is not law but “we do 
out best, we are cooperating, we invite”. So there is a change that is observed not only on the level of 
the EU Treaties or an international treaty but it is at all levels of the law. 
Loïc Azoulai:  
Notice how all the new measures go into the same direction, which is to impose sanctions on the 
member states. To exaggerate a bit, one could say that we are turning EU law into a structure of 
punishment of the member states; member states are constantly supposed to fail in economic 
performance, they are constantly under the pressure of reporting, monitoring, surveillance, sanctions. 
With this treaty, this is a new league of nations under control. 
Miguel Maduro:  
They need it!.. 
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz:  
The idea to use the ECJ to punish and sanction will undermine the law because it will not work. It is 
very easy to predict. 
Loïc Azoulai:  
What we have is an accumulation of rules on reporting, monitoring, surveillance, it is amazing. Two 
days ago there was again a report on the economic imbalances of the member states. And with this 
new procedure derived from the “six-pack”, again, there is a possibility of sanctions of the member 
states. 
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Anna Hyvärinen:  
I just want to point out that this agreement is not only problematic legally but also politically, more 
particularly in terms of governance. In the future, there will be three kinds of meetings: the European 
Council meetings, the Euro Summit meetings that started last year, and then meetings of the signatory 
states of the fiscal compact. So there will be three different kinds of meetings between the heads of 
states. In addition, of course, there will be regular Council meetings, Euro-group meetings and so on.  
Another point I want to make is that under the FCT, the president of the Euro Summit will be elected 
at the same time as the European Council president. I think that in practice this means that this will be 
the same person. 
Miguel Maduro:  
Unless there will be two important politicians unemployed at the same time… 
Anna Hyvärinen:  
Sure. But I still think that you are most likely to elect one person to preside both at the European 
Council and at the Euro-zone Summits. Does this also mean that in the future, it is always a person 
from a Euro-area country? Most likely so. 
Anwar Abdallat:  
There is another puzzling article in the FCT, Article 13, which is about parliamentary scrutiny and the 
whole idea of instituting democratic accountability. It is an international treaty, so, on the one hand, 
why the European Parliament? If is OK to borrow the institutions, on the other hand, the idea seems 
similar to the assembly of the Western European Union, which has been dissolved, and then the 
European Parliament along with national parliaments has taken over its scrutiny tasks regarding the 
powers of the EU.  What kind of a relationship will be this: only the parliaments of the signatory 
parties or all national parliaments of the EU? Moreover, if the European Parliament is taken to the 
margins of the project as it currently is, will it force it way with the other institutions trying to step in? 
Anna Hyvärinen:  
As far as I know this issue has not been discussed in Finland.  From the background material for this 
session it appears that there can be some problems in making reference to Protocol No 1 because all 
the parliaments are there, including the UK and the Czech parliaments, which have not signed the 
FCT. It remains to be seen what this will mean in practice. Another question is whether national 
parliaments will want to discuss their national budgets with the EP? The EP may want to do this but 
do the national parliaments also want to do it? The new agreement concerns mainly national budgets, 
which is a very sensitive issue. 
Loïc Azoulai:  
There is a reference in Article 3(2) last sentence that the mechanisms which will be put in place fully 
respect the prerogatives of national parliaments. Yet, it is also said before that there is an obligation to 
set up the mechanism which has been elaborated by the European Commission, so it is doubtful. 
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Bruno De Witte:  
I should like to add something about this Treaty’s institutional machinery, or rather the absence of it. 
The only new institution created by it is the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Contracting Parties that will presumably be convened in the margin of a European Council meeting, 
but there are no lower-level institutions with specific decision-making powers. This is why I would 
predict that not many legal activities will develop from the FCT. Any action taken under this 
agreement will either be unilateral, by the contracting parties themselves (for example: changing their 
constitution), or by the EU institutions acting upon the tasks given to them by the FCT. So, basically, 
all measures of Economic Union governance will continue to be adopted by the EU institutions, 
subject to EU law procedures and constraints.  
Anna Tsiftsoglou:  
I find the legitimacy issue central in this debate: if in these fiscal issues Germany imposes rules which 
it itself under its own constitution would not follow – and according to the BVerfG’s recent 
interpretations this is the way things are – I am sceptical how the policy would work. 
Miguel Maduro:  
This crisis and this treaty connect to a much deeper crisis in European integration. It is what we hear 
all the time now, that at the core of the economic and fiscal crisis there is a political crisis. If you read 
newspaper articles, every day there is an economist or a policy-maker, someone, who tells us what the 
European Union should do but no one tells how to get the European Union to do that. This is the really 
difficult question. The overwhelming majority of economists, with few exceptions, have by now 
agreed on a model, with certain variations, of what ought to be the answer to the crisis: a mixture of 
austerity and economic growth policies, a mixture of sanctions and conditionality with elements of 
solidarity and mutualisation of debt. We all know that this needs to be done but no one knows how to 
get the European Union to do it. From my point of view, we cannot do anything about it in the short 
term. This is why I can only say what the Union can do if it gets out of this crisis, if it survives this 
crisis. There is nothing within the mechanisms internal of the Union to solve the crisis, for it depends 
on national political dynamics. Yet, this tells us what we can do in the future: 
1. ensure that this kind of issues do not depend purely on national dynamics; that is, ensure that 
European policies and European problems depend on European politics; 
2. make those national political dynamics more Europe-sensitive. 
I do not think that this crisis is the responsibility of Germany, I do not think that Germany is the 
country to be most blamed, but on the other hand it is true that some of the aspects that could 
somehow solve the crisis are now being blocked by Germany. So why is Germany doing it? Because 
Mrs. Merkel is being democratically accountable: she is doing what the majority of the German public 
wants her to do. The question we need to answer is why doesn’t she get the right political incentives? 
It has to do with the perception about the European issues on the national level in member states. It 
happens to be in Germany but it could be in other member states on other issues. We have not been 
able to internalize in our national politics the interdependence that we have in the European Union. 
Because we have not internalized this interdependence, national politics operates in a way that 
provides wrong incentives for national action at European level. We have not been able to replace 
national politics in areas where we should by European politics. This is what we could do in terms of 
changing the structure of decision-making, though this cannot be done in the short term. As a lawyer 
who thinks about EU constitutional law, I think of what this crisis teaches me so I can try to have an 
impact on the future. 
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Boris Rigod:  
You talk about political incentives, and this is what is done in this treaty: it gives incentives not to 
pose externalities in inter-dependent European Union. What happened is that one member state by its 
fiscal and budgetary policy imposed externalities on the whole Euro area, not the other way around. 
To say now that Germany has wrong political incentives is not the whole story. 
Miguel Maduro:  
You are right, and it is the fiscal policy not of only one member state. Some member states were more 
serious than the others, some took irresponsible decisions, others were cheating, but it is the 
responsibility for fiscal policy of different member states, including my own. Different member states 
that provoke externalities each other. Some economists have argued that these irresponsible policies 
were fed by banks from other central and northern countries that had excessive liquidity and wanted to 
provide credit and make bigger profits. This also tells us something about the nature of European 
politics. In the US, when people talk about the responsibility for the financial crisis, they do not say 
that it is the responsibility of the people who have taken credit when they could not afford it; they talk 
about the responsibility of the banks that have provided the money when they should not have. While 
in Europe the dominant narrative is the other way around: it is those who borrowed money that are to 
blame. It is interesting how narratives are framed; they are framed also thanks to the nature of the 
political space in Europe. The narrative and the explanations differ between the European countries, so 
it is also difficult to generalize: for some it is the public debt, for others like Ireland it is the banking 
crisis. It is dangerous to create black-and-white narratives. That’s why it is also dangerous to say now 
that it is the responsibility of Germany if Europe does not get out of the crisis: it is another black-and-
white narrative. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann:  
I think the German perspective of the legitimacy question is very different from the Greek perspective. 
The German perspective emphasizes very much that the legitimacy of the Eurozone rules is gone: all 
the Euro-zone member states have persistently violated the budget discipline, the debt discipline, so 
without the rule of law there is no legitimacy. 
Loïc Azoulai:  
Including Germany. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: 
Yes, of course. But the Lisbon Treaty does not provide for a bailout: there is a prohibition, and it 
approaches the problem in terms of preventing the violation of rules but if the rules are consistently 
violated, there is no bailout clause. So from the German perspective, the problem is how to justify the 
legitimacy of what we are doing with the European Stability Mechanism – of course we have to do it – 
how can we promote growth – it is a stability and growth pact. Here, I think that the German 
conception of legitimacy is what is emphasized in all the six-pack regulations, the quotations in the 
preambles of all the six-pack regulations and the directives. It is stronger national ownership of the 
agreed rules and disciplines, said in one phrase, the rule of law. Without the rule of law, from the 
German perspective, there cannot be any legitimacy. Having said this, austerity is not enough, 
everybody knows it. It has always been a growth and stability pact. The problem is how to create 
growth. 
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Federico Fabbrini: “The rule of law: intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism” 
I have some perplexity as to what extent does this treaty add to the rule of law and I am quite sceptical 
about its effectiveness. Budgetary rules constraining the member states already existed in the Stability 
and Growth Pact but the SGP was not respected because it was subject to mere intergovernmental 
enforcement. If European history has taught us anything, it is that intergovernmentalism has not 
increased the rule of law. It is only through the Community method and by empowering supranational 
institutions that we can ensure that the states comply with the Treaties. Since the Fiscal Compact 
Treaty is inspired by an intergovernmental logic, however, it is difficult to see how this pact will be 
able to increase the rule of law in the field of economic policy in the European Union. 
Antoine Duval:  
Coming back to Miguel’s point, this treaty can also be seen as creating a narrative which is black-and-
white. We discussed already how legally it would be complicated to implement it. Hence, this treaty, 
and I agree with Anna Hyvärinen, is very much a political thing, a political narrative that states that 
the crisis is mainly due to the failure of the growth and stability pact. In reality, this treaty is hiding the 
fact that there were very big economic imbalances that the Euro enhanced and that were not managed 
by the European institutions. This is the core of the economic weakness of the Euro-zone, which this 
treaty does not solve. It might hide this fact a little longer but we will be faced with these problems 
again and we will have to decide whether, and how, to go on with the euro and the European Union. 
Miguel Maduro:  
No bailout was the greatest potential guarantee for the fiscal discipline of the states. It was not so 
much the stability pact but the idea that a state could fail and there would be no bail out that was 
expected to lead markets to impose discipline on states. The expectation was that the markets would 
differentiate, but the markets did not differentiate. This also to do with the responsibility of the banks 
of the wealthier countries: they were the first ones who did not differentiate in granting the debt and 
the credit because they were making money on it. As in the US, banks were making money by 
granting credit to easily. The system did not work because there was no differentiation between the 
different public debt of the member states of the Euro. Now, the system is differentiating, and it is 
differentiating also where it should not differentiate. In fact, if we want to have the possibility for 
some states to recover or if we want to have a really non-distorted competition in the internal market it 
makes no sense for companies in the internal market not to have equal access to credit. I know 
companies in Portugal now that are perfectly solid and which mostly depend on foreign markets but 
don’t have access to credit or when they do it is at much higher interest rates than their competitors in 
the internal market. Banks in other members states are using the so called country risk criteria in a 
rather blind and absolute manner denying credit to companies that may even be in a better financial 
and economic position than those in other states. The internal market for financial services is not 
working in that respect. This is the irony: we did not have differentiation where we ought to have it, 
that is between states, and we are having differentiation now where we ought not to have it. One of the 
most important things that could be done to help countries in difficulty to get out of the crisis is to give 
to companies from these states access to credit at interest rates that allow them to compete in the 
internal market. If these companies are forced to move, as it is already happening, the vicious circle 
just spirals down. 
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POSTSCRIPT: A MATTER OF TRUST 
A recurring issue of European integration that underlies the FCT is the problem of trust between the 
peoples of Europe. At the dawn of the European Communities, it was a matter of trust between the 
states in each other’s intentions to preserve peace; this trust was promoted through the creation of 
economic interdependence between member states in the internal market. Deepening economic 
integration and the creation of the Euro increased not only interdependence but also the likelihood that 
national economic governance create externalities on other member states.  
The Euro crisis undermined trust between member states in each other’s economic governance, and 
the solution for fostering trust offered by the FCT risks to compromise legitimacy of the Union in both 
“doubting” and “doubted” peoples. On the one hand, for member states such as Germany, the FCT 
does not offer a mechanism that would ensure prevention of crises in the future in as much as it is less 
enforceable than Union law and in substance adds little to the pre-existing EU arrangements. On the 
other hand, for member states such as Greece, the treaty imposes rules that lie at the heart of national 
sovereignty and self-determination of peoples, as perceived not only by the German Constitutional 
Court in its Greek bailout judgment but also by member states of the Union generally, which did not 
insert binding rules on national budgets into the Union Treaties.5 The fact that the signatory states of 
the FCT provided for its entry into force upon only 12 ratifications, evidences that they anticipated 
reluctance of their peoples to accept budgetary rules not deliberated in the national democracy.6 For 
this reason, the new treaty may prove damaging for the trust of citizens in both the Union and 
individual member states. 
The problem of legitimacy is not new for the European Union; it is connected to the fact that the 
Union, and the European Communities from which it evolved, were not designed to withstand such a 
strong degree of interdependence. It is a Union of independent states,7 in which democratic (process) 
legitimacy is firmly grounded in the national level: the Treaties (and amendments thereof) are ratified 
unanimously by all the peoples of Europe; members of the European Parliament are elected on 
national (and not European) level; national governments represent their peoples in the Council. In this 
construction, interference with the national democratic system undermines the legitimacy of the Union 
itself. Yet, the decisions taken by national governments produce externalities on the peoples of other 
member states, the latter not being represented in the national democratic process of other states and 
thus being unable to influence the decisions that affect them. To balance this situation, the European 
system of economic governance, while operating through “soft law”, provides for a rigid system of 
sanctions on states with excessive public deficit. This constitutes an inbuilt incoherence within the 
Union structure:8 member states are sovereign and budgetary decisions are an integral part of self-
determination of peoples, yet interference into this right of self-determination takes place whenever 
the exercise of this right creates externalities on other member states. European integration, therefore, 
creates a misbalance, which needs to be adjusted in a manner coherent with the Union’s constitutional 
structure. 
                                                     
5
 Giuliano Amato, oral evidence before the House of Lords, European Union Committee 25th Report of Session 2010–2012 
Report: The euro area crisis, Annex p. 3. 
6
 Already in 2006, the Eurobarometer survey of European public opinion signalled concerns in smaler member states over 
“the supremacy, and even imperialism, of the “strong” countries – i.e., France, Germany, the United Kingdom”, 
European Commission, DG Communication, The European Citizens and the Future of Europe (2006). 
7
 For the most recent analysis, see Bruno De Witte, The European Union as an International Legal Experiment, in JHH 
Weiler and G. De Burca, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (2012) Cambridge. 
8
 Roland Bieber,  Observer - Policeman - Pilot: On lacunae of legitimacy and the contradictions of financial crisis 
management in the European Union, EUI LAW 2011/16, p. 11. 
Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty 
19 
Previously, in EC law, the European Court of Justice developed principles that protect individuals in 
cases where they are not represented in the national political process yet are affected by it. This was 
done through affirmation of directly effective rights of the individual against the state in situations that 
have a “Community dimension”, thereby placing a check on state action when this action creates 
externalities beyond its own political system9 and adding to the output legitimacy of the Union 
through enforcing policies more effectively than sanctions. The Euro crisis illustrates that the 
“Community dimension” of national governance has grown far beyond cases of people, goods and 
services (hypothetically) crossing the internal borders. It is now the state debt that “crosses the  
internal borders”. 
Paradoxically, despite the obvious cross-border effects of poor national governance in ever more 
integrated Europe, the right of Union citizens to good governance is only applicable vis-à-vis the 
Union but not vis-à-vis member states. This right is contained, for example, in Articles 41 and Article 
42 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 15 and 228 TFEU, as well as secondary EU law 
adopted under these competences. In other instances, principles such as legal certainty, coherence, 
access to review, obligation to state reasons or proportionality apply to action by member states only 
when Union law or freedoms are involved. This piecemeal approach leaves out situations where the 
competence to act remains with the member states, yet national action produces effects in other states 
of the Union as a result of the expanding and deepening nature of European integration. Uniting the 
various rights under a single EU fundamental right to “good governance” that would be applicable to 
all national acts (similar to e.g. non-discrimination on the grounds of sex or nationality) would 
contribute to greater convergence of national systems and cultures of governance. In essence, the FCT 
makes a first step in this direction by applying to member states one of good governance rules 
contained in the Union Treaties, the balanced-budget rule of Article 310 TFEU until now applicable to 
Union but not national budgets. Extending this approach to other Treaty provisions would not only 
raise the trust of European peoples in each other’s governments but also answer their hopes for Europe 
as promoter and guarantor of better governance at all levels. 
 
Anna Kocharov 
Florence, 5 March 2012 
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ANNEX: CONCISE BACKGROUND OF THE FISCAL COMPACT 
Anwar Abdallat 
 
The evolution of the sovereign debt crisis foreclosed access of the Member States with high levels of 
budget deficit and public debt to sustainable financing on the financial markets. This prompted the 
Union and its member states to adopt a number of instruments of various legal nature and duration: 
measures under EU law, measures in national law, amendment of Union Treaties, private-law and 
international-law instruments. What follows is a summary reconstruction of the main legal and 
political instruments leading to the FCT, starting with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 1 
December 2010 and limited to the sovereign debt crisis. A table in the end of this section reconstructs 
how some of these provisions have subsequently “travelled” into the fiscal compact. 
1. Instruments of Crisis Management 
Actions by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
Article 127(2) TFEU lists the tasks of the ECB, which include the promotion of “smooth operation of 
payment systems”. The Euro crisis undermined smooth operation of payment systems, which led to 
the ECB purchasing bonds of distressed Euro area countries on the secondary market and creating loan 
facilities, which enjoy leverage thanks to the access to ECB lending. Arguably, this undermines the 
general prohibition on overdraft facilities and intra-EU bailouts in Articles 123 and 125 TFEU. In its 
Decision 8 December 2011, the ECB granted an unprecedentedly large loan at low interest rates for 
three years to private banks of Euro member states; to implement this loan, the ECB changed its 
rules10 on “adequate collaterals” required by the TFEU.11 
The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) 
In May 2010, the Council established a rescue mechanism, the EFSM, which allowed emergency 
lending to Greece with the money raised by the Commission on the financial markets.12 The legal 
basis used for the EFSM was Article 122(2) TFEU, which provides for powers of the Council, on the 
proposal from the Commission, to grant financial assistance in cases of “exceptional occurrences” 
beyond the requesting state’s control. The appropriateness of this legal basis in cases where the 
government of the requesting state “had contributed to create the sovereign debt crises which they 
were facing” is questionable.13 
                                                     
10
 Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 December 2011 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem 
refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral (ECB/2011/25) (2011/870/EU) OJ L341/65. 
11
 Article 18(1)b Protocol 4 TFEU. 
12
 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJ L 
118/1. 
13
 De Witte, Bruno, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism, Working Paper 
Europapolitisk Analys/European Policy Analysis, 2011, 6, 1-8, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) 
2011/06. 
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The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
The EFSF is an intergovernmental lending facility created by a combination of an instrument of 
international law concluded between the Euro area member states14 with an instrument of private law 
of one Member State.15 The Facility issues its own debt under a guarantee undersigned by the Euro 
area member states plus Sweden and Poland. The EFSF allowed larger lending amounts for future 
lending and no longer used the legal basis in Article 122(2) TFEU.  
Amendment of the TFEU and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
Right from their conception, the short-term emergency solutions offered by the EFSM and EFSF were 
to be replaced by the long-term stability mechanism, the ESM.16 In order to provide a legal basis for 
ESM, for the first time EU member states used the simplified Treaty amendment procedure introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty.17 The resulting amendment added one paragraph to Article 136 TFEU: 
3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality. 
Pursuant to this new legal basis, on 11 July 2011, finance ministers of the Euro area countries signed 
the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.18 Following the difficult ratification 
process in Slovakia, the ESM was renegotiated to begin already in July 2012.19 
2. Instruments of Economic Governance 
The ECB beyond Monetary Policy 
On 5 August 2011, the then-President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet and his designated successor 
Mario Draghi addressed to the constitutional organs of Italy a letter20, proposing to this country a list 
of ‘crucial’ economic and social policy measures, the most suited legal instruments for their 
implementation, and a timeline for Parliamentary ratification, including a suggestion of a 
“constitutional reform tightening fiscal rules”. This letter, although not binding, exceeds the 
                                                     
14
 EFSF Framework Agreement between Kingdom of Beligium, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Estonia, Ireland, 
Hellenic Republic, Kingdom of Spain, French Republic, Italian Republic, Republic of Cyprus, Grean Dutchy of 
Luxemboug, Republic of Malta, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Republic of Austria, Portuguese Republic, Republic of 
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Republic of Finland and the European Financial Stability Facility, 
www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf (03.03.2012). 
15
 European Financial Stability Facility, a société anonyme incorporated in Luxembourg, Council Regulation No 407/2010, 
OJ 2010 L 118, p. 1. 
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 European Council 28-29 October 2010 Conclusions EUCO 25/1/10 REV 1 CO EUR 18 CONCL 4, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117496.pdf, p.2. 
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 Article 48(6) TEU. 
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 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, available at: www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.en12.pdf (03.03.2012). 
19
 European Council, Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State and Government Brussels, 9 December 2011, p.5 available 
at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126658.pdf. 
20
 The full text of the Letter in English is available at:                                                                            
www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-
4da866778017.shtml?fr=correlati (29.02.2012). 
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competences of the ECB under the Union Treaties21 creating a “precedent for economic governance”, 
which until then fell “within the prerogative powers of the Member States”.22 
The European Semester 
In 2010, the Council approved a procedure for closer coordination of national budgets and economic 
policies.23 This procedure, called the European Semester, divides the year into two semesters. In the 
first semester, member states present their draft budgets, stability and convergence programs to the 
Commission and member states for a review of their conformity with the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the targets set in the Europe 2020 strategy.24 Based on this review, the European 
Council and the Commission issue policy advice to member states, following which the latter finalize 
their national budgets in the second semester. 
The ‘Six-Pack’ 
In September 2010, the Commission delivered a package of six legislative proposals (the so-called 
‘Six-Pack’), which were adopted in November 2011 and entered into force on 13 December 2011. It is 
composed of the following measures: 
1. Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, which 
foresees imposition of gradual financial sanctions for breach of fiscal policy targets unless a 
‘reverse qualified majority’ in the Council is reached against the Commission’s proposal to 
impose sanctions. 
2. Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area, which provides that a repeated failure to act on Council recommendations will expose 
euro area member states to sanctions, unless these are voted down by a reverse qualified 
majority of euro area member states. 
3. Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, which 
reinforces and amends the Stability and Growth Pact, empowering the Commission to issue a 
warning in case of significant deviations from fiscal policy goals. 
4. Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, empowering the Council 
to adopt recommendations and open an excessive imbalance procedure for Member States with 
imbalances that put at risk the functioning of the EMU. 
5. Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
which enhanced the corrective role of the Stability and Growth Pact by setting out rules on the 
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio where it exceeds 60% (reduction rate of 1/20th per year); an 
excessive deficit procedure is launched in the case of deviations. 
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 General Report on the Activities of the European Union (2010) European Commission, p. 14, 
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6. Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States, establishing common rules on accounting systems, statistics, forecasting 
practices, fiscal rules, budgetary procedures and fiscal relations with local and regional 
authorities. 
In November 2011, the Commission proposed two additional regulations building on the European 
Semester.25 The first proposed regulation would give the Commission the power to assess draft 
budgets of the Euro area countries and, if necessary, request that these drafts be revised; the draft also 
proposes closer monitoring and reporting requirements for euro area countries in excessive deficit 
procedure, and requires euro area Member States to establish independent fiscal councils for budget 
forecasts. The second proposed regulation would empower the Commission to subject member states 
to enhanced surveillance, while the Council would issue recommendations for corrective action. 
The Euro-Plus Pact 
The Euro-Plus Pact26 is a political commitment of the Euro area states and open to non-Euro member 
states and aimed at closer coordination of economic policies. The pact contains a list of commitments 
linked to the Europe 2020 strategy, with the participating states signing up to the commitments of their 
choice. The commitments target competitiveness, employment, sustainability of public finances, and 
financial stability. Compliance with these commitments is being monitored but there is no mechanism 
for enforceability. 
The following is a comparison table, which traces key provisions of the Fiscal Compact Treaty to the 
preceding legal and political arrangements; the left column contains the terms of the FCT, while the 
right column gives the corresponding provisions of the preceding instruments. Highlights added by the 
author. 
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 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area 
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COMPARISON TABLE OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE  
FISCAL COMPACT TREATY 
 
FISCAL COMPACT TREATY PREVIOUS CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS 
Rules of the Fiscal Compact 
 
Article 3(1)a 
the budgetary position of the general government of a 
Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus; 
Article 109(3) Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Federal Law Gazette Part III, No 100-1, 
as amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 944) 
The budgets of the Federation and the Länder shall in 
principle be balanced without revenue from credits. 
[…] 
 
Article 3(1)b 
the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be 
respected if the annual structural balance of the 
general government is at its country-specific medium-
term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and 
Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural deficit 
of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market 
prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid 
convergence towards their respective medium-term 
objective. The time-frame for such convergence will 
be proposed by the European Commission taking into 
consideration country-specific sustainability risks. 
Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term 
objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall 
assessment with the structural balance as a reference, 
including an analysis of expenditure net of 
discretionary revenue measures, in line with the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact; 
Article 115(2) Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Federal Law Gazette Part III, No 100-1, 
as amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 944) 
Revenues and expenditures shall in principle be 
balanced without revenue from credits. This principle 
shall be satisfied when revenue obtained by the 
borrowing of funds does not exceed 0.35 percent in 
relation to the nominal gross domestic product.  
In addition, when economic developments deviate 
from normal conditions, effects on the budget in 
periods of upswing and downswing must be taken into 
account symmetrically. Deviations of actual borrowing 
from the credit limits specified under the first to third 
sentences are to be recorded on a control account; 
debits exceeding the threshold of 1.5 percent in 
relation to the nominal gross domestic product are to 
be reduced in accordance with the economic cycle. 
Article 1(3)b Regulation 1467/97 as amended by 
Regulation 1177/2011 
The report [of the Commission under Article 126(3) 
TFEU] shall reflect, as appropriate: […] the 
developments in the medium-term budgetary 
positions, including, in particular, the record of 
adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary 
objective, the level of the primary balance and 
developments in primary expenditure, both current and 
capital, the implementation of policies in the context of 
the prevention and correction of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, the implementation of 
policies in the context of the common growth strategy 
of the Union, and the overall quality of public 
finances, in particular the effectiveness of national 
budgetary frameworks; 
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Article 3(1)c 
the Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from 
their respective medium-term objective or the 
adjustment path towards it only in exceptional 
circumstances, as defined in point (b) of paragraph 3; 
Article 109 (3) Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Federal Law Gazette Part III, No 100-1, 
as amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 944) 
[…] The Federation and Länder may introduce rules 
intended to take into account, symmetrically in times 
of upswing and downswing, the effects of market 
developments that deviate from normal conditions, as 
well as exceptions for natural disasters or unusual 
emergency situations beyond governmental control 
and substantially harmful to the state’s financial 
capacity. For such exceptional regimes, a 
corresponding amortisation plan must be adopted. […] 
 
Article 3(1)d 
where the ratio of the general government debt to 
gross domestic product at market prices is 
significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of 
long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the 
lower limit of the medium-term objective specified 
under point (b) can reach a structural deficit of at 
most 1,0 % of the gross domestic product at market 
prices; 
Article 1 Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (TFEU) 
The reference values referred to in Article 126(2) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
are: 
- 3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government 
deficit to gross domestic product at market prices; 
- 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross 
domestic product at market prices. 
 
 
Article 3(1)e 
in the event of significant observed deviations from the 
medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards 
it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered 
automatically. The mechanism shall include the 
obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to 
implement measures to correct the deviations over a 
defined period of time. 
 
Article 3(4) Regulation 1467/97 as amended by 
Regulation 1177/2011 
The Council recommendation made in accordance 
with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum 
deadline of six months for effective action to be taken 
by the Member State concerned. When warranted by 
the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for 
effective action may be three months. The Council 
recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit, which shall be 
completed in the year following its identification 
unless there are special circumstances. […] 
 
Article 3(2) 
The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the 
national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one 
year after the entry into force of this Treaty through 
provisions of binding force and permanent character, 
preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to 
be fully respected and adhered to throughout the 
national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties 
shall put in place at national level the correction 
mechanism referred to in paragraph 1(e) on the basis 
of common principles to be proposed by the European 
Commission, concerning in particular the nature, size 
and time-frame of the corrective action to be 
undertaken, also in the case of exceptional 
circumstances, and the role and independence of the 
institutions responsible at national level for monitoring 
 
Article 4(1) Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
November 2011 on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in 
the euro area COM(2011) 821 final 
Member States shall have in place numerical fiscal 
rules on the budget balance that implement in the 
national budgetary processes their medium-term 
budgetary objective as defined in Article 2a of 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. Such rules shall cover 
the general government as a whole and be of binding, 
preferably constitutional, nature. 
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compliance with the rules set out in paragraph 1. Such 
correction mechanism shall fully respect the 
prerogatives of national Parliaments. 
 
Article 4 
When the ratio of a Contracting Party's general 
government debt to gross domestic product exceeds 
the 60 % reference value referred to in Article 1 of the 
Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure, 
annexed to the European Union Treaties, that 
Contracting Party shall reduce it at an average rate of 
one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided 
for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying 
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 
1177/2011 of 8 November 2011. The existence of an 
excessive deficit due to the breach of the debt criterion 
will be decided in accordance with the procedure set 
out in Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
 
Article 2(1)a Regulation 1467/97 as amended by 
Regulation 1177/2011 
When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the 
government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) 
shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace 
in accordance with point (b) of Article 126(2) TFEU if 
the differential with respect to the reference value has 
decreased over the previous three years at an average 
rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, based 
on changes over the last three years for which the data 
is available.  
 
Article 5 
1. A Contracting Party that is subject to an excessive 
deficit procedure under the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded shall put in place a 
budgetary and economic partnership programme 
including a detailed description of the structural 
reforms which must be put in place and implemented 
to ensure an effective and durable correction of its 
excessive deficit. The content and format of such 
programmes shall be defined in European Union law. 
Their submission to the Council of the European 
Union and to the European Commission for 
endorsement and their monitoring will take place 
within the context of the existing surveillance 
procedures under the Stability and Growth Pact.  
2. The implementation of the budgetary and economic 
partnership programme, and the yearly budgetary plans 
consistent with it, will be monitored by the Council of 
the European Union and by the European Commission. 
Point 11, European Council Conclusions, 17 June 
2010 EUCO 13/10 CO EUR 9 CONCL 2 
The present rules on budgetary discipline must be 
fully implemented. As regards their strengthening, the 
European Council agrees on the following 
orientations: […] 
b) Giving, in budgetary surveillance, a much more 
prominent role to levels and evolutions of debt and 
overall sustainability, as originally foreseen in the 
Stability and Growth Pact; 
c) from 2011 onwards, in the context of a "European 
semester", presenting to the Commission in the spring 
Stability and Convergence Programmes for the 
upcoming years, taking account of national budgetary 
procedures; 
d) ensuring that all Member States have national 
budgetary rules and medium term budgetary 
frameworks in line with the Stability and Growth 
Pact; their effects should be assessed by the 
Commission and the Council; 
 
The Euro Plus Pact, European Council Conclusions 
24/25 March 2011 EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1 14 
p. 14: This Pact has been agreed […] to strengthen the 
economic pillar of the monetary union, […] 
 
Article 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
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States experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability in 
the euro area COM(2011) 819 final 2011/385 
(COD) 
1. This Regulation sets out provisions for 
strengthening the economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability and/or that receive or may receive 
financial assistance […] 
 
Article 6 
With a view to better coordinating the planning of their 
national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties shall 
report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to 
the Council of the European Union and to the 
European Commission 
Point 11, European Council Conclusions, 17 June 
2010 EUCO 13/10 CO EUR 9 CONCL 2 
The present rules on budgetary discipline must be 
fully implemented. As regards their strengthening, the 
European Council agrees on the following 
orientations: […] 
b) Giving, in budgetary surveillance, a much more 
prominent role to levels and evolutions of debt and 
overall sustainability, as originally foreseen in the 
Stability and Growth Pact; 
c) from 2011 onwards, in the context of a "European 
semester", presenting to the Commission in the spring 
Stability and Convergence Programmes for the 
upcoming years, taking account of national budgetary 
procedures; 
 
Article 7 
While fully respecting the procedural requirements of 
the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, 
the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro 
commit to supporting the proposals or 
recommendations submitted by the European 
Commission where it considers that a Member State of 
the European Union whose currency is the euro is in 
breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an 
excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not 
apply where it is established among the Contracting 
Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified 
majority of them, calculated by analogy with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded, without taking into 
account the position of the Contracting Party 
concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or 
recommended. 
 
Regulation 1173/2011/EU 
 
Article 4(2) 
The decision requiring a lodgement shall be deemed to 
be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a 
qualified majority to reject the Commission’s 
recommendation within 10 days of the Commission’s 
adoption thereof. 
 
Article 5(2) 
The decision requiring a lodgement shall be deemed to 
be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a 
qualified majority to reject the Commission’s 
recommendation within 10 days of the Commission’s 
adoption thereof. 
 
Article 6(2) 
The decision imposing a fine shall be deemed to be 
adopted by the Council unless it decides by a qualified 
majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation 
within 10 days of the Commission’s adoption thereof. 
 
Article 8  
1. The European Commission is invited to present in 
due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the 
provisions adopted by each of them in compliance 
with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after 
having given the Contracting Party concerned the 
opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its 
 
Article 258 TFEU 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has 
failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall 
deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving 
the State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
observations. If the State concerned does not comply 
with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Anna Kocharov (ed.) 
28 
report that such Contracting Party has failed to comply 
with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union by one or 
more Contracting Parties.  
Where a Contracting Party considers, independently of 
the Commission's report, that another Contracting 
Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), it may 
also bring the matter to the Court of Justice.  
In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice 
shall be binding on the parties to the proceedings, 
which shall take the necessary measures to comply 
with the judgment within a period to be decided by the 
Court of Justice.  
2. Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of 
the European Commission, a Contracting Party 
considers that another Contracting Party has not taken 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment 
of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it 
may bring the case before the Court of Justice and 
request the imposition of financial sanctions 
following criteria established by the European 
Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If 
the Court of Justice finds that the Contracting Party 
concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may 
impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment 
appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not 
exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The 
amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose 
currency is the euro shall be payable to the European 
Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payments shall be 
made to the general budget of the European Union.  
3. This Article constitutes a special agreement between 
the Contracting Parties within the meaning of Article 
273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Article 8 provides that the EU Court of Justice 
may rule on whether parties have complied with the 
requirements of Article 3(2); and that the Court may 
levy a fine of up to 0.1 per cent of GDP if its ruling is 
not complied with. 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
  
Article 259 TFEU 
A Member State which considers that another Member 
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaties may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
Before a Member State brings an action against 
another Member State for an alleged infringement of 
an obligation under the Treaties, it shall bring the 
matter before the Commission. 
The Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion after 
each of the States concerned has been given the 
opportunity to submit its own case and its observations 
on the other party’s case both orally and in writing. 
If the Commission has not delivered an opinion within 
three months of the date on which the matter was 
brought before it, the absence of such opinion shall not 
prevent the matter from being brought before the 
Court. 
 
Article 260 TFEU 
1. If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds 
that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment 
of the Court. 
2. If the Commission considers that the Member State 
concerned has not taken the necessary measures to 
comply with the judgment of the Court, it may bring 
the case before the Court after giving that State the 
opportunity to submit its observations. It shall specify 
the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be 
paid by the Member State concerned which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
If the Court finds that the Member State concerned has 
not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump 
sum or penalty payment on it. 
This procedure shall be without prejudice to Article 
259. 
3. When the Commission brings a case before the 
Court pursuant to Article 258 on the grounds that the 
Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its 
obligation to notify measures transposing a directive 
adopted under a legislative procedure, it may, when it 
deems appropriate, specify the amount of the lump 
sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member 
State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
If the Court finds that there is an infringement it may 
impose a lump sum or penalty payment on the Member 
State concerned not exceeding the amount specified 
by the Commission. The payment obligation shall take 
effect on the date set by the Court in its judgment. 
 
Communication from the Commission of 1 
September 2011, SEC(2011) 1024 final 
Updating of data used to calculate lump sum and 
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penalty payments to be proposed by the Commission 
to the Court of Justice in infringement proceedings 
Economic Policy Coordination 
 
Article 9 
Building upon economic policy coordination, as 
defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to 
work jointly towards an economic policy that fosters 
the proper functioning of the economic and monetary 
union and economic growth through enhanced 
convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the 
Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and 
measures in all the areas which are essential to the 
proper functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the 
objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting 
employment, contributing further to the sustainability 
of public finances and reinforcing financial stability.  
 
The Euro Plus Pact, European Council Conclusions 
24/25 March 2011 EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1 14 
 
p. 14: This Pact has been agreed […] to strengthen the 
economic pillar of the monetary union, achieve a new 
quality of economic policy coordination, improve 
competitiveness, thereby leading to a higher degree of 
convergence. This Pact focuses primarily on areas that 
fall under national competence and are key for 
increasing competitiveness and avoiding harmful 
imbalances. Competitiveness is essential to help the 
EU grow faster and more sustainably in the medium 
and long term, to produce higher levels of income for 
citizens, and to preserve our social models. […] 
p. 16: The choice of the specific policy actions 
necessary to achieve the common objectives remains 
the responsibility of each country […] 
 
Article 10 
In accordance with the requirements of the Treaties on 
which the European Union is founded, the Contracting 
Parties stand ready to make active use, whenever 
appropriate and necessary, of measures specific to 
those Member States whose currency is the euro, as 
provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and of enhanced 
cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the 
Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union on matters that are essential for the proper 
functioning of the euro area, without undermining 
the internal market. 
 
Article 136 TFEU 
1. […] the Council shall, in accordance with the 
relevant procedure from among those referred to in 
Articles 121 and 126, with the exception of the 
procedure set out in Article 126(14), adopt measures 
specific to those Member States whose currency is the 
euro: 
(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of 
their budgetary discipline; 
(b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, 
while ensuring that they are compatible with those 
adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under 
surveillance. 
2. For those measures set out in paragraph 1, only 
members of the Council representing Member States 
whose currency is the euro shall take part in the vote. 
[…] 
 
Article 20 TEU 
1. Member States which wish to establish enhanced 
cooperation between themselves within the framework 
of the Union’s non-exclusive competences may make 
use of its institutions and exercise those competences 
by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties, 
subject to the limits and in accordance with the 
detailed arrangements laid down in this Article and in 
Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
Enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the 
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and 
reinforce its integration process. Such cooperation 
shall be open at any time to all Member States, in 
accordance with Article 328 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
2. The decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall 
be adopted by the Council as a last resort, when it has 
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established that the objectives of such cooperation 
cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the 
Union as a whole, and provided that at least nine 
Member States participate in it. The Council shall act 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 
329 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
3. All members of the Council may participate in its 
deliberations, but only members of the Council 
representing the Member States participating in 
enhanced cooperation shall take part in the vote. The 
voting rules are set out in Article 330 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. 
4. Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced 
cooperation shall bind only participating Member 
States. They shall not be regarded as part of the acquis 
which has to be accepted by candidate States for 
accession to the Union. 
 
Article 326 TFEU 
Any enhanced cooperation […] shall not undermine 
the internal market or economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier 
to or discrimination in trade between Member 
States, nor shall it distort competition between 
them. 
 
Article 11 
With a view to benchmarking best practices and 
working towards a more closely coordinated economic 
policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major 
economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake 
will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, 
coordinated among themselves. Such coordination 
shall involve the institutions of the European Union 
as required by European Union law. 
The Euro Plus Pact, European Council Conclusions 
24/25 March 2011 EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1 14 
 
p.15: Each year, concrete national commitments will 
be undertaken by each Head of State or Government. 
In doing so, Member States will take into account best 
practices and benchmark against the best performers, 
within Europe and vis-à-vis other strategic partners. 
The implementation of commitments and progress 
towards the common policy objectives will be 
monitored politically by the Heads of State or 
Government of the euro area and participating 
countries on a yearly basis, on the basis of a report by 
the Commission. 
[…] It will be in line with and strengthen the existing 
economic governance in the EU, while providing 
added value. It will be consistent with and build on 
existing instruments (Europe 2020, European 
Semester, Integrated Guidelines, Stability and Growth 
Pact and new macroeconomic surveillance framework) 
[…] and accompanied with a timetable for 
implementation. These new commitments will 
thereafter be included in the National Reform and 
Stability Programmes and be subject to the regular 
surveillance framework, with a strong central role for 
the Commission in the monitoring of the 
implementation of the commitments, and the 
involvement of all the relevant formations of the 
Council and the Eurogroup. The European 
Parliament will play its full role in line with its 
competences. Social partners will be fully involved at 
the EU level through the Tripartite Social Summit. 
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[…] 
Governance 
 
Article 12 
1. The Heads of State or Government of the 
Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall 
meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together 
with the President of the European Commission. The 
President of the European Central Bank shall be 
invited to take part in such meetings. 
The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed 
by the Heads of State or Government of the 
Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by 
simple majority at the same time as the European 
Council elects its President and for the same term of 
office. 
2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place when 
necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss 
questions relating to the specific responsibilities which 
the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro 
share with regard to the single currency, other issues 
concerning the governance of the euro area and the 
rules that apply to it, and strategic orientations for the 
conduct of economic policies to increase convergence 
in the euro area. 
 
Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 26 October 
2011, Annex 1: Ten measures to improve the 
governance of the euro area                                                                    
p. 11: There will be regular Euro Summit meetings 
bringing together the Heads of State or government 
(HoSG) of the euro area and the President of the 
Commission. These meetings will take place at least 
twice a year, at key moments of the annual economic 
governance circle; they will if possible take place after 
European Council meetings. 
 

  
 
